Thank you, Mr. Amend, for giving the dangers of electronic voting
machines some much-needed press. The more people who are informed
about such a frightening threat to our democratic process, the better.
In an attempt to convince a complacently skeptical public of just how
much a problem that direct-recording electronic voting machines pose,
Jon Stokes of Ars Technica has written a guide, How to steal an
election by hacking the vote, which illustrates just how easy it is to
hijack an election conducted entirely over electronic media.
If nothing else, watch this video by the security researchers at
Princeton University’s Center for IT Policy, wherein researchers
demonstrate how to load a malicious payload onto a Diebold voting
machine in under one minute. Come election day, this payload, a computer
virus which spreads to other machines through normal memory card
exchange, silently skews the vote toward its preferred candidate; these
alterations are made untraceable by the fact that these voting machines
provide users with no voter-verifiable paper trail. Such a virus could
even delete itself once the election has concluded, leaving behind no
evidence within the machine itself.
In concluding his article, Mr. Stokes sums up the problem nicely:
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